Efficient and Location-Private Communication Protocols for WBSNs by Braeken, An & Singelée, Dave
Efficient and Location-Private Communication
Protocols for WBSNs
AN BRAEKEN1⋆, DAVE SINGELEE2
1 Department of Industrial Sciences and Technology, Erasmushogeschool Brussel,
Belgium
2 ESAT-COSIC, K.U.Leuven & IBBT, Belgium
Received 16 September 2011; In final form 1 June 2012
To provide healthcare to large heterogeneous populations, one
envisions new ways of remote healthcare monitoring in the form
of ubiquitous and pervasive healthcare systems. However, the
widespread deployment of this technology will depend on the
extent to which security and privacy can be guaranteed. In this
article, we propose a set of efficient, practical and scalable cryp-
tographic protocols for wireless body sensor networks. Taking
into account the computational resources of the sensors, the cryp-
tographic operations performed by the latter exclusively rely on
symmetric key cryptography. Our communication protocols guar-
antee data confidentiality, data authentication, and location pri-
vacy of the patient. In addition, we propose an authorization
scheme based on time frames. This restricts the doctor’s access
to the patient’s medical data in time, and explicitly enforces the
minimal data disclosure principle. Our proposed remote mon-
itoring system outperforms the current state-of-the-art, since it
offers security and privacy protection, efficiency and scalability.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The fast and ever increasing development of new wireless technologies and
standards is revolutionizing the conventional e-health systems and leads to
the migration from fixed to mobile platforms, opening new possibilities and
business opportunities. For instance, wireless technologies may ease remote
monitoring of life parameters of patients, allow the implementation of tele-
consulting services, and drastically improve the spreading and management
of clinical information by allowing the creation of a flexible healthcare sys-
tem, easily deployable in any site.
The development of remote medical monitoring systems will have a large
impact on society, as it offers improved healthcare and a significant cost re-
duction in social security. Considering that the average age of the human
population grows significantly, the demand for innovative, high-quality, low-
cost medical solution is prominent. In this article we will address the imple-
mentation of a wireless body sensor network (WBSN), which offers a remote
mobile medical monitoring service. Potential users of this system include
people with chronic diseases, homebound and elderly people, etc.
To facilitate widespread adoption of WBSN technology, a number of se-
curity and privacy implications must be explored to promote and maintain
fundamental medical ethical principles and social expectations [8]. Security
vulnerabilities could result in medical harm or even death, since actions by
the medical staff will be based on the collected medical data. On the other
hand, users will not accept WBSN technology if they could be traced because
of the sensors they are carrying, or if their medical data, which is extremely
sensitive, is publicly exposed.
Some security schemes have been set up for wireless sensor networks.
However, these mechanisms don’t work very well in WBSN since there are
some subtle differences between these two networks. Firstly, the number of
sensors and the range between the different nodes is much more limited in
WBSN. Secondly, the sensors are less prone to physical attacks since they are
under surveillance of the person carrying them. Last of all, the requirements
for privacy are much stronger in WBSN, as discussed before. These specific
characteristics, together with the rigid constraints in area, memory, power,
energy, etc., should be taken into account.
In the scheme we propose in this article, we have opted for an unbalanced
communication protocol, where complex operations are shifted towards the
back-end system. The protocol between the sensors and central server relies
exclusively on the use of symmetric key cryptography. This makes the so-
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lution very suitable to be used in WBSNs. Important design parameters are
practicality and scalability, two items which are ignored in several solutions
proposed in the literature.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setting we
envision and the corresponding security aspects and assumptions that we
consider for the communication flows between patient, doctor, and central
server. These different communication schemes are explained more into de-
tail in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes the security and privacy properties of our
scheme. Furthermore, we give a preliminary view on the performance of our
solution and demonstrate its feasibility. Section 5 discusses related work and
its limitations. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
2 SYSTEM AND MODEL
We consider the system model in this work. A patient is wearing one or more
sensors which form a WBSN. The sensors have a multi-hop connection to the
PDA or the mobile phone of the patient [28]. This device is uniquely linked
to the patient and is used to manage the set of sensors attached to the patient’s
body. It is also responsible for forwarding the monitored medical information
of the sensors to the central server of the hospital. The forwarding takes place
at either irregular times, as a result of a certain trigger, or in case of emer-
gency. When the medical data arrives at the central server, first an analysis
is made on the received information. The data is then immediately deleted
on the central server and sent to a public database of the hospital, where it
is stored in encrypted format. Medical staff from the hospital or a local doc-
tor/nurse are granted access to this data after a successful authorization (e.g.
by means of their eID card). To connect to the central server and consult the
patient’s medical information, they can use a PDA or a mobile phone. The
communication setting is illustrated in Figure 1. In the rest of this article, we
will discuss how the security and privacy protection of these communication
flows can be guaranteed.
2.1 Security and privacy requirements
Since medical data of a patient is sensitive information, it is an interesting
target for attacks performed by a malicious third party. One should note that
the medical data is available at various places during its entire lifetime. It is
sent from the sensors to the server, stored in a public database, and consulted
by medical staff. During all these stages, data protection is necessary. This
includes [16]:
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Figure 1
System model
• Confidentiality: information should be kept secret from all but those
who are authorized to see it.
• Data authentication: one should be able to corroborate the source of
the information and to be ensured that the information has not been
altered by unauthorized or unknown means.
In addition, also location privacy should be ensured. This is often ne-
glected in previous work, but is nevertheless a very important issue. Since the
sensors are fixed on the body of the patient, tracking and tracing of the patient
becomes relatively straightforward. The use of temporary pseudonyms [9, 17]
is a very popular countermeasure to thwart this attack. To avoid additional key
sharing and data storage, as is typically required in these schemes and which
would increase the cost, we will directly integrate the use of pseudonyms in
our security solution.
Note that there are many attacks which can be carried out on the sys-
tem. An adversary can overhear the wireless communication between sen-
sors, PDA, central server and medical staff. This could potentially lead to
interception of the data. Other attacks include altering, deleting or inserting
data, replay attacks, denial-of-service attacks, etc. To counter these poten-
tial vulnerabilities, it is essential that the medical data is transmitted in an
encrypted format, being authenticated (e.g., using a message authentication
code), and that freshness of data is guaranteed (using a counter, timestamp or
nonce). Not only the wireless communication channel should be protected,
but also the storage of the data. Attackers can physically break into one or
more components and consequently try to steal the stored information.
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2.2 Assumptions
Before we define our communication protocols, it is important to clearly state
the assumptions which our solution is based on.
We assume the sensors are tamper resistant. This can be realized in several
ways. When the sensor platform consists of both a tamper vulnerable part
(e.g., common sensor node hardware) and a tamper resistant part (e.g., a smart
card or a cryptographic micro controller), implementation parameters such as
price, complexity and power consumption remain reasonable [18]. Another
solution for introducing tamper resistance is by exploiting challenge-response
pairs of physical uncloneable functions (PUFs) [25, 5] in the communication
protocol. These are functions that are embodied in the physical structure of
the sensor. The functions are easy to evaluate, i.e., to compute the response
for a given challenge. However, they are very hard to characterize due to
the randomness of many components in the physical structure and cannot be
cloned. Since a PUF depends on the physical molecular structure, any change
in that structure will have an effect on the challenge-response pair.
Since the medical data is stored encrypted, it is not necessary to put it
in the tamper resistant hardware. The latter only contains the cryptographic
keys and other security related material. It should however be stressed that
it is quite unlikely that an adversary can access a sensor node attached to the
patient’s body, without the patient noticing this. As a result, in many practical
use cases one can relax the requirements on the tamper resistance and hence
reduce the price and complexity.
Also the other devices in the scheme need storage protection. Secret and
private keys should be secretly stored. Extra care should be taken on the
doctor’s PDA, since this device will contain decrypted medical information
from the patient. Countermeasures should include secure deletion of data
from memory, sandboxing, etc. Since such techniques are commonly used
in state-of-the-art implementations, we will not discuss them further in this
article. Finally, also the central server should be physically protected since it
aggregates, analyzes and stores all the medical information. That is why the
data is only stored in encrypted format. This relaxes the requirements on the
databases access control enforcement.
Furthermore, we assume that each sensor stores two secret keys: one key
shared with the central server, and one key shared with the patient’s PDA.
Besides these shared keys, both the patient’s PDA and the central server have
a public/private key pair, which is used to secure their communication. Since
these devices are less resource constrained, conventional cryptographic tech-
niques and protocols can be used. We will particularly focus on the commu-
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nication protocols with the sensors, as this is a challenging design task.
In the next sections, we will present a practical security solution based on
the requirements and assumptions mentioned above. For efficiency reasons,
the protection of the communication between sensors and the medical server
will be exclusively based on symmetric key cryptography. In addition, we
propose a data access control scheme that is not only based on identity, but
also on the time of the data retrieval request. This is particularly important in
scenarios where the doctor does not need to know the entire medical history
of the patient. Such an access control system limits the access to the collected
medical data with respect to a certain time, even when the data is stored in
a public database. Note that systems with this property of time frame autho-
rization have been previously described in [26], but these rely on the use of
less efficient cryptographic techniques.
3 PROPOSED COMMUNICATION SCHEMES
We first discuss some notations and pre-installation steps that need to be per-
formed by the different entities (sensor, patient’s PDA, central server, doc-
tor’s PDA) in the system. Next, we describe the communication protocol
between the sensor and the central server, and between the doctor and the
central server, more into detail.
3.1 Notations
For clarity reasons, we will use the following notations in the rest of this arti-
cle: Se denotes the sensor, CS the central server, P the patient’s identity, and
D the doctor’s identity. The central server stores a secret master key, which
is denoted by cs. The private key of the patient’s PDA is denoted by pp. Sk
represents a signature algorithm using the private key k, Ek an encryption
algorithm using the key k, MACk a message authentication code under the
secret key k, and h a cryptographic hash function. Ctr denotes a counter
shared between two or more devices in the network, and sn a sequence num-
ber.
3.2 Underlying key agreement protocol
Since the security protocol between the sensors and the central server is based
on symmetric key cryptography, an initial secret key has to be shared between
the different communication parties. For efficiency reasons, we propose an
“identity based” cryptographic approach. The shared secret key is derived
from the MAC on the unique hardware ID of the device that is most resource
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constrained (e.g., the sensors), while the MAC is computed by the entity that
has most resources available (e.g., the central server) using its secret key. For
example, the shared key between a sensor and the central server can be repre-
sented by MACcs(IDSe). By using this approach, the key can be stored by
the former and only needs to be computed on the spot by the latter. Because
of this construction, the sensor does not need to perform a complex crypto-
graphic operation such as computing a digital signature. It also improves the
scalability, since it avoids the central server storing all secret keys shared with
the sensors. One should however note that key update mechanisms need to be
employed if a particular key is used for a relatively long period. This is out
of the scope of this article.
3.3 Pre-installation
Before communication can take place between sensor and central server, or
between the doctor’s PDA and the central server, keys need to be pre-installed
on the different communication parties. We suppose that this pre-installation
is trusted and organized by the hospital. The following steps take place:
• Sensor: Each of the sensors securely stores two secret keys: MACcs(IDSe)
and kps = MACcs(IDP || IDSe). The former is shared with the cen-
tral server, while the latter is shared with the patient’s PDA. Without
loss of generality, we assume that these keys have the appropriate key
sizes. If not, one first has to apply a key expansion or reduction func-
tion. Furthermore, each sensor also has a unique counter Ctr, which
will serve as a countermeasure against replay attacks.
• Patient’s PDA: To bind the patient’s PDA uniquely to the patient’s
identity, the device is first registered at the central server (this could
even be done remotely, using the patient’s electronic identity card).
After this step, the patient’s identity IDP and the corresponding pub-
lic key (e.g., combined in a certificate) are stored on the central server,
while the PDA stores the central server’s public key. Furthermore, the
PDA and the central server share a sequence number sn, used to avoid
replay attacks. It could also be replaced by a timestamp. When a sensor
is put on the patient’s body, the central server sends a message to the
patient’s PDA that contains the sensors’ identity IDSe and the corre-
sponding secret key kps = MACcs(IDP || IDSe). These keys can
be computed on the spot by the central server. For each of the sensors,
the PDA also stores the value of the counter Ctr. Note that the data
stored on the PDA can be copied to multiple of the user’s devices. This
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increases reliability and avoids an update mechanism when the PDA is
replaced, but also decreases the security level (since the probability of
an attacker compromising a device and stealing the keys increases).
• Central server: As discussed above, the central server stores a list
of the identities of the patients that are registered, together with their
public key (or certificate) and the sequence number sn. It also contains
a list of the doctors’ identities IDD and an up to date access control
list, describing which patient files can be accessed by which medical
staff member at which time frame. The determination of this list is
out of scope of this article. To maximize scalability, the central server
does not need to store a list of sensors put on the patient’s body. After
this information has been sent to the patient’s PDA, the central server
deletes its from its memory.
• Doctor’s PDA: The PDA of the doctor stores a secret keyMACcs(IDD),
which it shares with the central server. These keys are only stored on
the doctor’s PDA, the central server computes them on the spot. This
improves scalability.
Note that this pre-installation is practical and straightforward. Only when a
patient enters the hospital and sensors are put on his body, the pre-installation
process takes place on the central server and the sensors. The patient manages
on his PDA the list of active sensors attached to this body. Each time a sensor
is removed from his body, this information is entered in the PDA (e.g., by
entering an identifier printed on the sensor during fabrication). Without such
an update, an attacker could inject false medical information in the system by
using a compromised sensor that is no longer attached to the patient. Note
that keeping this list up to date is not a cumbersome process. Sensors are
only rarely removed from the patient’s body, and the number of sensors in
a WBSN is typically rather limited. When a new sensor needs to be added
to the WBSN, no changes are required at the other sensors, causing no extra
delay.
3.4 Communication between sensor and central server
The first communication channel we will discuss, delivers the monitored
medical data from the sensor to the central server, through the patient’s PDA.
It is a one way communication protocol from sensor to central server. This
data is sent at at either irregular times, as a result of a certain trigger, or in
case of emergency. Note that a possible trigger can be a request from the
8
central server to update the latest data or to provide extra info about a certain
parameter to improve the treatment. In that case the communication is not
purely unilateral.
As mentioned before, each sensor shares a key kps = MACcs(IDP ||
IDSe) and a counter Ctri with the patient’s PDA. The counter is used to en-
sure data freshness and authorization based on time, and is updated after each
communication round. One could also replace the counter by a timestamp,
but this is more complex to implement securely and efficiently, particularly
on the sensors. When a sensor wants to transmit medical data, when triggered
or at irregular time frames i, it first computes a session key Ki corresponding
to that particular time frame i. This session key is derived from the shared
secret key with the central server MACcs(IDSe).
Ki = (ki || k
′
i) = h(MACcs(IDSe) || Ctri).
The session key Ki is split in two different parts (ki || k′i). The key ki
will be used for symmetric-key encryption, while the key k′i will be used
for authentication. It is a general, however not proven, rule to take different
values for both features.
After having constructed the session key, the sensor sends its monitored
data m to the central server. Since the sensor cannot communicate directly to
the server, all information in the WBSN is sent to the patient’s PDA. More in
detail, the following message is sent:
Ekps(IDSe || Ctri), Eki(m),MACk′i (m). (1)
After sending the message, the sensor increments the counter by one. When
the patient’s PDA receives this message, it will decrypt the first part trying
all keys kps. Since the number of sensors in the WBSN is limited, the com-
plexity of this operation is reasonable. Next, it checks the identity of the
sensor IDSe and the counter Ctri. If the sensor is still part of the WBSN and
the counter is strictly larger than the current value stored in the PDA, the mes-
sage is accepted. Using public-key cryptography, the PDA then constructs the
following encrypted message Esc(IDP || IDSe || Ctri) and the signature
Spp(sn || IDSe || Ctri). Here sn denotes the sequence number for com-
munication with the central server. Note that it is important that the signature
algorithm does not have a message recovery functionality, to avoid tracking
attacks. After having constructed these messages, they are concatenated to
the data that was sent by the sensor. More in detail, the following message is
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sent to the central server:
Eki(m),MACk′i(m), Esc(IDP || IDSe || Ctri),
Spp(sn || IDSe || Ctri). (2)
After sending the message, also the patient’s PDA augments the counter of
the corresponding sensor and the sequence number sn. When receiving this
message, the central server first decrypts the message that was encrypted us-
ing its public key and obtains the identity of the patient IDP . Then it checks
the validity of the signature by using the public key of the patient, and verifies
that the sequence number sn is strictly larger than the value stored in memory.
If these checks are successful, it knows that the message was approved by the
patient’s PDA and is not replayed (because of the sequence number). Next,
the sequence number is increased by one, and the shared key MACcs(IDSe)
is computed. By combining it with the counter Ctri, the central server can
compute the session key Ki. Using this session key, the message Eki(m) is
decrypted and the MAC can be verified (to be ensured of the authenticity and
the integrity of the data). The result of the decryption is the monitored data
m. The server then analyzes this medical data, alarms the doctor when nec-
essary, and puts the data in the public database (see next paragraph). Instead
of signing data with its private key, the PDA could also carry out a key agree-
ment protocol with the central server. The outcome of this protocol is a secret
session key, which then can be used to guarantee the authenticity the medical
data sent to the central server. This solution will not be discussed further in
this article.
The communication protocol between the sensor, patient’s PDA and the
central server is summarized in Fig 2.
3.5 Medical data stored in the database of the central server
After checking the authenticity of the medical data, the central server puts
it in a public database. Authorized medical staff can consult this database
when necessary (see next paragraph for the protocol details). Since access to
the medical data can be restricted in time, it is important to add a timestamp
to the data. To link the time to a communication round, the central server
computes a timestamp ti corresponding to the value of the sequence number
sn. More in detail, the following information is stored in the database:
IDP , ti, Esc(IDSe || Ctri), Eki (IDSe || IDP || ti || m),
MACk′
i
(Eki(IDSe || IDP || ti || m))
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Figure 2
Communication from sensor to central server
Note that IDP is included in plaintext for efficiency reasons. If the central
server needs to send information to the doctor afterwards, the server which
contains the database will have to search through the whole database to find
the data for the corresponding patient. Now it can just search for the correct
patient and time frame, and then decrypt the first encrypted message to com-
pute the session key, which is needed to decrypt and check the authenticity of
the rest of the message. This key can then be transported to the doctor’s PDA
(see next paragraph). In fact, IDP represents a meaningless number for an
outsider. Only the patient and the doctor possess the linking information be-
tween the number IDP and the name of the patient. Even if an attacker is able
to link the number IDP to a patient’s name, no further medical information
of the patient is leaked since the rest of the database is encrypted.
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Of course, this solution is not perfectly privacy prone and is made in a
trade-off with efficiency. It is possible to simply remove that information,
but as said before, this would require a complete search through the whole
database.
3.6 Communication between doctor’s PDA and central server
The communication channel between the central server and the PDA of the
doctor is bidirectional. In case of an emergency, the central server needs
to contact a doctor, taking into account the necessary authorization require-
ments. The other situation is that a doctor wants to consult the information
before or after visiting the patient.
As denoted before, cs is the private key of the central server, and IDD the
unique ID of the doctor. The shared secret key, which is stored in the central
server, is equal to MACcs(IDD). This secret key is stored in the secure
memory of the doctor’s PDA, and can be computed on the spot by the central
server. The keys used for encryption and authentication respectively are kd ||
k′d = MACcs(IDD). Let us now discuss the communication protocols (for
both directions of the communication flow) more in detail.
Communication initiated by the central server This communication is
organized in at least two phases, and in general in three phases, as will be
briefly discussed now. The detailed cryptographic operations are presented in
Figure 3.
• During the first phase, the central server alarms an authorized doctor
by sending an emergency message me, using the shared secret key
MACcs(IDD). As a countermeasure against replay attacks, a times-
tamp ti is used instead of a counter since both communication parties
possess more computer power and resources (compared to a sensor).
By using a timestamp, there is no need to store a synchronized counter.
• The doctor first looks up the secret key and then checks the validity
of the timestamp and the MAC. Next, he replies with a message m′,
concatenated with a timestamp t′i. There are three possible answers
m′ = {m′f ,m
′
n,m
′
e}. If the verification of the timestamp and/or MAC
fails, m′ = m′f . If the doctor is unable to react at that moment, he
replies with m′ = m′n. If he wants to react positively to the request,
the reply is m′ = m′e.
• If the doctor has replied with m′e, and the checks on the timestamp
and the MAC are valid, the central server computes the session keys
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Communication from central server to doctor
needed to consult the necessary medical data stored in the database.
These cryptographic keys are sent to the doctor’s PDA. Access is given
for a fixed number of time slots. The corresponding set of pointers L
to the entries in the database are also sent to the doctor, to facilitate the
search in the database.
Initiated by the doctor’s PDA The secret key shared between the doc-
tor’s PDA and the central server is, as already discussed above, kd || k′d =
MACcs(IDD). We shortly describe the two secure communication steps.
The detailed cryptographic operations of these phases are presented in Fig-
ure 4.
• During the first phase, the doctor submits a request to the central server,
containing a timestamp and the identity of the patient and/or sensor(s).
The request is encrypted using the key kd and its authenticity is pro-
tected by computing a MAC (using key k′d). Without loss of generality,
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Communication from doctor to central server
we only focus on the situation where the doctor wants to obtain the
information from one sensor IDSe. The solution where the doctor re-
quests information from one particular patient is very similar.
• The central server first exhaustively tries all the different keys, corre-
sponding to the list of doctors, until it finds a match. Then it checks
the timestamp, MAC, and the authorization privileges of the doctor.
When all checks are positive, the cryptographic keys and pointers for
consulting the encrypted database are returned (this is identical to the
last phase in the previous communication scenario).
4 ANALYSIS
The design of practical, efficient, scalable, secure and privacy-preserving
cryptographic protocols for remote monitoring applications will enable the
widespread of WBSN technology. In this section, we will discuss some im-
portant features of our proposed solution.
4.1 Security discussion
The main security properties of our system are as follows:
• When a sensor node is compromised by an attacker or not needed any-
more, it will be removed from the sensor network and also from the list
of active sensors, stored and managed at the patient’s PDA. Since each
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sensor shares a different key with the PDA and central server, crypto-
graphic material from a compromised node cannot be used to carry out
attacks on other nodes.
• When cryptographic keys are used for a relatively long period, they
should be updated. This avoids some attacks on the cryptographic
primitives used in the protocols, which could even result in the com-
promise of secret or private keys. For instance, if an adversary can
compromise the private key of a device, he could decrypt all the ex-
changed messages, including these from the past. A good guideline
is to change the private key regularly, e.g. every year. Since this is
standard practice, it will not be discussed further in this article.
Also the counter and the sequence number should be renewed when
their maximum value is reached in order to avoid replay attacks. How-
ever, in realistic settings, this will never be the case. Suppose, for in-
stance, a sensor submitting every minute a message. For 32-bit coun-
ters starting from 0, it will take more than 8000 years before the counter
reaches its maximum value. Having 10 sensors in the network, also a
32-bit sequence number will last more than 800 years.
• Since the medical data is encrypted with a shared key, it remains con-
fidential to eavesdroppers. The secret keys used to secure the commu-
nication channel between sensor and PDA or central server cannot be
derived by a passive eavesdropper. This follows from the properties of
the cryptographic building blocks used in the protocol, and from the
fact that a secret key shared between A and B can only be computed
by means of a MAC of A on the identity IDB of B. Since the keys are
either computed on the spot, or stored in secure memory, an attacker
cannot steal them.
• The integrity and authenticity of the data is guaranteed since every
transmitted message contains a MAC on the content of the message.
The correctness of the data source can be guaranteed by the fact that
the secret session key is only known by the sender and the intended
receiver.
• We used timestamps and counters to avoid replay attacks in our com-
munication protocol. A particular attack we prevent in our protocol, is
old or fake medical data being injected in the system. A compromised
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sensor cannot inject fake data, because the patient’s PDA will not ac-
cept data from that sensor. Sending it directly to the central server is
also not possible, since the compromised sensor cannot spoof the sig-
nature of the patient’s PDA. An attacker can also not inject old medical
data in the system. The patient’s PDA will detect this replay attack
because the shared counter Ctri is not higher than the stored value.
Sending the data directly to the central server is not possible. The latter
will reject the signature of the PDA embedded in the message, since it
does not contain a fresh sequence number.
• Only sensors that were initialized during the pre-installation process,
received shared secret keys. Other sensors are not in the list of active
sensors, and do not share a key with the patient’s PDA. They can hence
not communicate with this device. Sending information directly to the
central server is not possible, since the MAC of the patient’s PDA on
the sensor’s identity IDSe is required. Due to the construction of the
messages in the protocol, all data sent by the PDA (see Eq. 2) is linked
to each other.
4.2 Privacy discussion
To achieve location privacy, none of the entities in the system puts its identity
in the messages it transmits. This avoids an attacker tracing a patient or a
doctor by the data that his device(s) broadcast. Since the identities are not
directly put in the message, the receiver has to perform an exhaustive search
on the list of possible communication parties. This is however still a reason-
able operation. The patient’s PDA only communicates to a small number of
sensors (the size of a WBSN is typically rather limited), and the number of
doctors registered at the central server is also assumed to be rather low. Also
note that the exhaustive search is carried out by the communication party with
most computing power. This unbalance is necessary to maximize the overall
efficiency.
However, since the number of patients registered at a hospital could be
relatively large, we used a different mechanism to protect the communication
flow between the patient’s PDA and the central server. The patient’s PDA
puts its identity (and the one of the sensor) in an encrypted message. Since
this message also contains the counter Ctri, which is never used twice, the
ciphertext will be random for an outsider and can hence not be used for track-
ing.
Note that the data from the sensors to the central server is not sent at reg-
ular time frames since that would facilitate to trace the patient and thus be in
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conflict with the privacy restrictions.
4.3 Scalability
Scalability is one of the main requirements when designing a remote moni-
toring system. When many patients are registered at the central server, the
number of sensors that transmit their medical data could become quite large.
Therefore, it is not scalable to manage all the WBSNs from one central loca-
tion (i.e., the central server). That is why we distributed this functionality into
the system. The patient’s PDA is responsible for managing its sensor network
where it is connected to. Since the number of sensors in the WBSN is limited,
this is a reasonable task. The central server then manages the patients’ PDAs
from which it gets the medical data. The magnitude of the number of patients
is much smaller than the number of sensors. Furthermore, the central server
also manages the list of doctors which can consult the medical data. Also this
list is assumed to be manageable.
Note that our solution can easily be transformed into a solution where the
sensors directly send their data to the central server (via a gateway such as a
mobile phone). This is possible because the shared key between the sensor
and the PDA can also be computed by the central server. The disadvantage
of this direct forwarding mechanism, is that the central server should have
to manage the list of active sensors. This is less scalable than our original
solution. One can also opt for a hybrid scheme, where some of the WBSNs
are managed by the PDAs of the patients, and other sensor networks directly
by the central server.
4.4 Performance discussion
Since sensors are resource constrained, efficiency is very important. We will
now show that our proposed protocols can be realized on current state-of-
the-art sensor platforms. To demonstrate the feasibility, we will select some
appropriate cryptographic primitives, and give an estimation of the perfor-
mance in this scenario. Note that we do not intent to give exact numbers on
the memory and energy consumption, we only want to show that our solu-
tions can be implemented using off-the-shelf components and conventional
cryptographic algorithms.
In our remote monitoring system, the body sensors clearly have the most
rigid resource constraints. That is why we will now focus on the cost of intro-
ducing cryptographic primitives on these devices. The body sensors are either
worn by or implanted in a patient. As a consequence, this requires a very low
power consumption to minimize radiation and maximize the lifetime. More-
over, these sensors also have very limited computational power and memory.
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TI Node MICAz Node MyriaNed
CPU 16bit, 8MHz 8bit, 16MHz 16bit, 32MHz
RAM 2KB 4KB 8KB
Flash Memory 64KB 128KB 128KB
Voltage 1.8 ∼ 3.6V 2.7 ∼ 3.3V 1.6 ∼ 3.6V
OS TinyOS TinyOS MyriaCore
Table 1
Specifications of some embedded micro controllers [6]
Table 1, published by Gong et al. [6], summarizes the specifications of some
embedded micro controllers, often used in sensor networks: TI node, MICAz
node, and MyriaNed.
Before discussing the details of the cryptographic algorithms, we first need
to fix the security level, taking into account the trade-off between performance
and computational resources. Depending on the use case scenario, a security
level of 64 bit or 128 bit is acceptable for resource constrained sensors. In
this article, we will compare the cost for both these security levels, based on
the results of [6] for implementations on the MICAz nodes (TinyOS version
2.10).
The protocols have been designed in such a way that the largest part of the
cryptographic computations and storage requirements are shifted towards to
the central server. There are only two cryptographic algorithms that should
be implemented on the sensor: one for encryption and one for computing
the MAC. This is the absolute minimum to ensure confidentiality and data
authentication. Let us now briefly describe the most optimal choices for both
types of algorithms in the context of 64-bit and 128-bit security.
• The standard encryption algorithm is AES [4], which can be used as a
128-, 190-, and 256-bit block cipher. Law et al. [12] have demonstrated
that AES is the most appropriate block cipher algorithm when a high
security level and energy efficiency are required in a wireless sensor
network. An ultra-lightweight block cipher that is recently proposed in
the context of RFID applications is PRESENT [1]. This block cipher
has an 80-bit key and a block size of 64 bits, resulting in a security level
of 64 bits.
• In [6], it is shown that the conventional MAC algorithms that are rec-
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64-bit security 128-bit security
PRESENT TuLP AES-128 TuLP-128
Functionality Enc MAC Enc MAC
Key size (bits) 80 80 128 160
Block size (bits) 64 64 128 128
RAM (bits) 1040 1048 1915 1056
ROM (bits) 1926 3302 12720 3718
Speed/8 byte (ms) 1.82 5.64 1.46 11.8
Table 2
Performance comparison of 64-bit and 128-bit security algorithms on MICAz
node [6]
ommended for wireless sensor networks have some practical problems
when applied in a WBSN. In their paper, they also introduce two new
secure and practical MACs that are particularly designed for body sen-
sor networks. The first MAC algorithm is TuLP and is based on the
PRESENT block cipher, thus having 64-bit block size and 80-bit key
size. The 128-bit variant is TuLP-128 and uses a 160-bit key.
Table 2 compares the parameters for these 64-bit and 128-bit algorithms,
based on the results of [6]. Note that in order to compute the exact per-
formance numbers, one can not simply add the numbers of the encryption
algorithm PRESENT and the MAC algorithm TuLP, since the code of the lat-
ter contains large parts of the PRESENT algorithm. However, these figures
give some estimation on the upperbound of the complexity. Comparing these
upperbounds with the specification of the body sensor (see Table 1), we can
conclude that both the 64-bit and 128-bit algorithm can be implemented on
the MICAz node. On the other hand, the RAM capacity of the TI node is too
small, even for the implementation with a security level of 64 bits.
Since complexity is shifted towards the patient’s PDA, for scalability rea-
sons, the computation and storage cost for the PDA is higher than the solution
where the PDA just acts as a gateway. Concerning storage, the patient’s PDA
needs to store the ID and counter information for each sensor. Since the
number of sensors in the network is very limited and the bitlength of both
variables is rather small, this extra cost is negligible. On the other hand, the
computation cost is increased with 1 symmetric key decryption, 1 public key
encryption, and 1 signature for each transmission by a sensor. Let us illustrate
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this with some numbers. We assume that 1024-bit RSA is used to compute
the signatures, that there are 20 sensors in the WBSN that send information
to the PDA once an hour. Based on the results of Potlapally et al. [21], the
energy cost of computing a 1024-bit RSA signature is approximately 546 mJ.
To carry out all the necessary cryptographic operations, the PDA will have
an energy consumption of approximately 0.26 KJ on one day. To put this
more into perspective, the typical energy content of a smartphone’s battery is
between 20 to 30 KJ.
However, we want to note that if you need to send frequently many data
from the PDA to the server, it is best to use symmetric key cryptography to
encrypt the data. One could use conventional key agreement protocols, such
as the STS (Station-To-Station) protocol, to agree on a symmetric session
key. In this case, the digital signature algorithm in protocol 2 is then replaced
by a MAC algorithm. If the size of the data that has to be transmitted to the
server is rather limited, then one could directly use a digital signature, as is
discussed in this article.
5 RELATED WORK
One of the most crucial components to support the security architecture of
a Wireless Sensor Network is its key management. There have been several
proposals in literature [10, 19, 20].
As mentioned before, WBSNs differ from WSNs at several crucial points:
number and range of the sensors, physical access to the sensors, and privacy
constraints.
Several prototype implementations, specific for WBSNs, are already avail-
able in literature. However, very often studies on data security and privacy are
missing in this area. An excellent recent survey on the general concept (ap-
plications, technologies, routing protocols, projects, etc.) of WBSNs can be
found in [11].
Most articles on security and privacy of WBSNs published in the literature
are either based on public key cryptography (e.g., [14, 26]), or on symmet-
ric key cryptography in combination with physiological features (e.g., [2, 3,
15, 22, 23, 27, 7]) to commute the shared secret key. Using public key cryp-
tography in WBSNs is not always a preferable solution due to the resource
constraints on the body sensors. Deriving a shared secret key from physiolog-
ical and/or behavioral characteristics is also not optimal since this approach
requires statistical or machine learning techniques to recognize the medical
data, which cannot be completely guaranteed.
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Besides these two large categories of solutions, we are aware of only two
other systems [24] where all cryptographic techniques for key distribution,
key management and communication rely exclusively on symmetric key cryp-
tography. However, the concept is different there, since it is required that
all the medical data is first analyzed at the gateway (patient’s PDA). In our
setting, the analysis is left to the central server to reduce the computational
overhead on the patient’s PDA. Moreover, due to our particular construction
of the shared secret key, we need less storage at the central server. This sig-
nificantly improves the scalability. The system proposed in this article also
includes an access control scheme based on time frames. The last difference
is that in our scheme location privacy is directly enforced, while in [24] an
add-on solution based on pseudonyms is proposed.
Note that in our work, we do do not focus on fine-grained distributed ac-
cess control solutions, meaning that the patient’s medical data is stored at
several places, and that access is enforced using a role based access control
model. The design challenges and a survey of such schemes can be found
in [13].
6 CONCLUSION
We have presented an efficient and practical system to protect the communica-
tion flow of sensitive medical information in wireless body sensor networks.
We proposed to construct a symmetric shared key, to secure the communi-
cation between a sensor and the central server, based on the central server’s
signature on the identity of the sensor. Such a construction drastically re-
duces the storage requirements at the central server. Our proposed solution
also took into account the requirement of location privacy. This avoids that
patients or doctors can be tracked by the devices they are carrying. Moreover,
to enforce the minimal data disclosure principle, the doctor’s access to the
patient’s medical data at the central server is restricted to a fixed number of
time slots. Our proposed cryptographic protocols are secure, privacy-friendly,
practical and efficient, and outperform the current state-of-the-art. It can di-
rectly be employed in a remote monitoring system based on wireless body
sensor networks.
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